University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Other Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2019

Preface to the Third Edition by the General Editor. Preface to The
New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules of Limited
Admissibility
Richard D. Friedman

University of Michigan, rdfrdman@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/224

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Friedman, Richard D. "Preface to the Third Edition by the General Editor." Preface to The New Wigmore: A
Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules of Limited Admissibility. 3rd ed., by David P. Leonard, xxiii-xxviii. New
York: Wolters Kluwer, (2019).

This Preface is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Other Publications by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION BY THE GENERAL..., WIGEVSR PREFACE...

The New Wigmore: Selected Rules of Limited Admissibility Preface to the Third Edition by the General Editor
Aspen Publishers | 3rd Edition 2022 Supplement
The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules of Limited Admissibility
David P. Leonard
Copyright © 2022 by David P. Leonard

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION BY THE
GENERAL EDITOR
As General Editor of this treatise, my principal job is to recruit an excellent team of authors; no one in the modern day could
hope to replicate John Henry Wigmore's one-man show. David Leonard, not only a superb scholar but also an exemplary person
through and through, was one of the first people I asked, and to my delight he joined the project. He tackled his assignment
with great ability and broad vision--and also graciousness in dealing with a slew of editorial comments from me. With a degree
of efficiency and industry that can perhaps best be described in this context as Wigmorean, he produced a volume covering
an important swath of rules that limit admissibility of certain types of evidence. Gallantly, even after being stricken by the
illness that ended his life very prematurely, he continued to be productive, and not only revised that volume but wrote another,
on uncharged misconduct. The volumes have been capably supplemented and updated by Prof. Arthur Best, and I am pleased
that newly revised editions are now being published. I believe that David's work has continued to stand up remarkably well
despite the passage of time.
I am happy to offer a few substantive thoughts on matters that struck me in reading through these volumes. These comments,
presenting my own perspectives for what they are worth, are by no means comprehensive; the issues they discuss are among
the many addressed by David in these substantively rich volumes.
The principal subject of these two volumes is a set of rules that have a similar structure: A given species of evidence is
rendered inadmissible to prove one proposition, despite the fact that it may have substantial probative value with respect to
that proposition, but it may be admitted, if circumstances warrant, to prove other propositions. Accordingly, David begins the
volume titled Selected Rules of Limited Admissibility with an extraordinarily careful discussion of the meaning, nature, types,
and consequences of limited admissibility. In the substantive contexts on which David is principally focused, courts often have
little alternative other than to give the jury a limiting instruction and hope that the jury understands it and complies. In other
contexts, limiting admissibility may be completely decisive of an issue, or even of the entire case. If the proponent has the
burden of producing evidence of proposition A, then a ruling that a given piece of evidence is admissible with respect to B but
not A may mean, depending on the other evidence in the case, that the proponent does not get to the jury at all on A. That may
be fatal if A is crucial to the proponent's case.
The balance of this volume discusses a range of particular rules that bar evidence of a given type when offered for a particular
purpose but contain no proscription against using it for other purposes. For example, subsequent remedial measures cannot be
offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct (or, in Federal Rule of Evidence 407's version of the rule, a defect in a product
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or its design or a need for a warning or instruction), and compromise offers cannot be offered to prove the validity or amount
of a claim. David carefully examines the rationales that purportedly underlie each of these rules. Most of them are perplexing.
In some cases, the evidence might be considered to be insufficiently probative to warrant admissibility given the possibility of
prejudice and other negative consequences, but that is not always so. Evidence of a defendant's offer to settle a million-dollar
claim for $10,000 does not prove much, is not worth any significant time, and is in fact far more likely to cause mischief than
to achieve anything positive. But a $900,000 offer surely has great value in demonstrating that the defendant believed it would
probably be found liable, and that indicates strongly (though of course not conclusively) that the defendant was liable. Given
the trial court's broad authority to exclude evidence that it believes is more prejudicial than probative, if that balance were all
that is at stake there would be no need for a categorical rule.
The possibility that such a rule is needed to give an incentive for conduct deemed socially beneficial (such as remedying a
dangerous situation or attempting to compromise a dispute) seems, at least at first glance, a more promising explanation: A
party concerned about evidentiary consequences is unlikely to engage in conduct in reliance on an exclusionary rule if the rule is
nothing more than an instruction to the trial court to make an inherently subjective balance of probative value and prejudice. But
such rationales may become less persuasive on closer scrutiny. As David points out, given that the evidence may be admissible
on grounds other than the ones designated by the rules, a party can never have complete confidence that the evidence will not be
admitted. And, as he shows in depth in the context of subsequent remedial measures, the rule is not the only factor determining
the party's conduct; it is not as if the rule maker's choices are Exclusion and Remedy (exclude the evidence, and the party will
take the remedial conduct) or No Exclusion and No Remedy (allow the evidence, and the party will not engage in the remedy).
The party may engage in the remedy without the exclusion, and may fail to do so even with the exclusionary rule. In many
cases, that rule may give the defendant an evidentiary windfall without having any impact on its behavior.
For this reason, I actually find appealing the old-fashioned rule (which the House of Representatives would have retained in
Federal Rule of Evidence 408) that statements made during the course of compromise negotiations are not covered by the
exclusionary rule unless they are accompanied by some form of words such as “without prejudice.” Is that a formalistic hoop?
Certainly. But rather than regarding it as “a preference for the sophisticated, and a trap for the unwary,” as the Senate Judiciary
Committee did, I regard the exclusion itself as giving a windfall to the unaware defendant who made the statement without
even being aware of the evidentiary protection. In this light, the hoop may be seen as a simple means by which a party who
contends that she acted in reliance on the exclusion can demonstrate that at least she was thinking of the exclusion when she
made the statement. Indeed, I believe it is worth considering whether the requirement of such an affirmative invocation of the
exclusionary rule should be applied to compromise offers, and even to subsequent remedial measures, as well as to factual
statements made during the course of compromise negotiations.
At least in the context of the compromise rule, David finds a fairness rationale attractive; it may appear unfair if the judicial
system uses against a party its socially beneficial conduct of trying to compromise a dispute. I am more skeptical. I am not sure
that the saying that “no good deed goes unpunished” is true, but one feature of doing a good deed, perhaps the principal factor
that makes it good, is that the actor does the deed despite expecting certain negative consequences. I do not find it troubling
that among those negative consequences may be evidentiary ones. Admitting one's misdeeds is socially beneficial conduct, but
there has never been serious thought to prevent such admissions from being used against the person who made them; rather,
they are given very receptive treatment by the evidentiary rules.
In contrast to Selected Rules, David's other volume is devoted to a single rule, governing what he calls uncharged misconduct.
In its most common application, the rule provides that bad acts of a criminal defendant, other than those actually charged against
him, cannot be introduced to prove that the defendant has a propensity to act in the manner of those acts and therefore more
likely did so on the occasion in question. But the evidence clearly would make a rational trier of fact believe precisely that;
although a given person may act in different ways depending on the situation, humans are not random actors, and some people
do have more of a tendency than others, across time and situation, to act in a given way. Nevertheless, for reasons that David
elucidates very well, the law has long regarded this to be an inappropriate form of proof. The rule is a good one, I believe,
because otherwise criminal trials would become more about what kind of a person the defendant is and less about what he did
or did not do on the particular occasion.
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But the rule also creates difficulties, and at times a perverse incentive for prosecutors. The rule does not exclude the evidence
when it is offered for any purpose other than the propensity inference for which it might be relevant. As David elaborates,
though many courts and commentators have regarded this principle as creating a set of exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the
better view, and the one clearly reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), is that the exclusion is a limited one, and when the
evidence is offered for purposes lying outside its boundaries then the rule simply does not come into play. And so, we often have
the phenomenon of prosecutors arguing that they need to introduce evidence of the defendant's uncharged misconduct on some
non-propensity ground. Sometimes that is a perfectly valid; if the theory of the case is that the defendant committed the charged
crime to cover up another misdeed, then the prosecutor presumably has a genuine need to prove the prior act to show motive.
But often, any but the most naive observer would recognize that the need cited by the prosecutor is a rather flimsy concoction,
and the true motivation for offering the evidence is hope that, notwithstanding a limiting instruction, the jury will in fact use
the evidence for a propensity inference. Thus, as David rightly emphasizes, the court must carefully engage in a case-specific
balancing of probative value versus prejudicial impact--with the possibility that the jury will quite rationally (but improperly)
use the evidence for the propensity inference counting on the prejudice side of the scale.
The need for that balance is one factor making this corner of evidence law so difficult in application (and thus, as David points
out, making Rule 404(b) the most heavily litigated of all the Federal Rules of Evidence). Another is that sometimes it is not so
easy to sort out what should be considered a propensity inference and what should not be. Consider, for example, the so-called
“doctrine of chances,” and in perhaps its most notorious setting: Smith, accused of drowning his wife for insurance money,
contends that she died accidentally, and the prosecution wants to prove that two other wives of Smith met their ends in the same
way. I take it as rather clear that the evidence ought to be admitted, and at least at first glance it appears that a possible basis
for admission - to prove that the charged death was not an accident--is very distinct from a propensity basis. But a closer look
clouds the picture. Simplifying somewhat, the evidence of the other deaths presents us with two basic alternative explanations:
that each was an accident, or that the defendant acted with an intention common in each case, to cause the death. The first
possibility seems improbable--and here is where the idea of “chances” comes in--because it depends on the coincidence of
repeated accidents, one not making any subsequent accident more likely. (In fact, one might think that if Smith had lost even
one wife to accidental drowning, he might become far more vigilant in the future.) The second is by far the more parsimonious
explanation, and therefore appears more likely to yield the evidence, because it depends only on the one assumption that the
defendant developed an evil intention that operated across the cases. But is that not simply a propensity inference? And if it
is, why is it permissible here? Because it is offered to dispel the possibility of accident? Perhaps. Does this mean the evidence
should be admissible only if the defendant opens the door by raising the possibility of accident? Perhaps. I believe this type
of question remains perplexing.
Not surprisingly, evidence of uncharged misconduct generates important procedural issues. I will touch on two. First, suppose
the defendant does not admit that he engaged in the other act that the prosecutor wants to prove. What standard should the court
use in determining whether the prior act is sufficiently proven to warrant admissibility? Courts have given a range of answers to
this question. The United States Supreme Court answered it for the federal courts in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681
(1988). There, the Court rejected the argument that the trial judge must make a preliminary determination to a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant engaged in the prior act. (Some courts have chosen even more demanding standards.) Rather,
the Court said, “In the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the
act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Many commentators have reacted negatively to this holding. David gives a
sensitive account of the Court's treatment but wonders whether it is insufficiently attentive to the possibility of prejudice. As
indicated above, I certainly agree with him on the necessity of careful attention to prejudicial potential, but it seems to me that
this should be done as part of an overall judgment as to admissibility and should not affect analysis of the question of standard
of proof. I believe that Huddleston follows naturally from the nature of the rule, as explicated above. If the rule were a broad
exclusion with exceptions, then the court would indeed have to make a preliminary determination as to whether the evidence fit
within an exception; this is what happens with respect to hearsay. But because the rule creates only a limited exclusion, and the
prosecutor purports to offer the evidence on a ground that lies outside that exclusion, the question is whether the evidence has
sufficient probative value to warrant admissibility on that ground. Indeed, I believe that one could imagine circumstances in
which the jury could not conclude more than that the prior act was plausible and yet the evidence would have enough probative
value to be admissible. That would be rare, however; I believe that Huddleston states a serviceable standard, so long as the trial
court is attentive to the question of prejudice.
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Second is the question of notice. Notice requirements have been a feature of several modern evidentiary rules, and one was
added to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in 1991. But note how broad its potential sweep is. The Rule says that “other ...
acts”--that is, other than the one charged, and not necessarily wrongful--may be admissible for “other purposes”--that is, other
than the propensity inference - but then, on request, a prosecutor must give notice “of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial.” So, in a bank robbery case, walking into the bank is not part of the crime charged; is that an “other”
act to which the notice provision applies? Presumably not. In its Note to the 1991 amendment, the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules cautioned that the notice provision was not intended to “““extend to evidence of acts which are ‘intrinsic’ to the
charged offense.” Even before the amendment, courts often used the intrinsic-extrinsic divide as a test for admissibility, the idea
being that if the particular evidence is sufficiently closely related to the acts being charged then admissibility may be warranted
notwithstanding the exclusionary rule. As David ably shows, such a categorical test is really not necessary for that purpose;
whether the court categorizes the evidence as intrinsic or extrinsic, it will still have to make the assessment of probative value
versus prejudice. But now the same test has been called on to determine whether the notice provision applies--and so naturally
it has created litigation over what is intrinsic. Perhaps more than anything, what is necessary in applying the notice provision
is a large dollop of judicial common sense.
***
My hope throughout this project has been that this Treatise would be the first place that readers would go to find comprehensive,
careful, thoughtful, and insightful discussions of evidentiary issues. David Leonard worked valiantly and well towards that
goal before leaving us at far too young an age. I am pleased that for generations to come his work will continue to inform and
enlighten discussion of the important and difficult issues addressed in these volumes.
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN
Ann Arbor, Michigan
May 2019
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